Literature Review Rough Draft

In this post, I am going to take a preliminary swing at my literature review section by rehearsing the basic argument in a more free-flowing written form. In this manner, I hope to capture the essence of what I want to say in a format that is accessible and can subsequently be refined and polished.

My study adopts a neoclassical realist model in order to blend the insights of international relations (IR) theory with that of Chinese area studies. Most models of international politics analyze Chinese foreign policy primarily within the framework of structural realism. These approaches only offer half of the story and are subject to several significant critiques. At the same time, an approach that privileges China’s “uniqueness” also misses the overriding importance that international pressures and relative capabilities do play in the formation of Chinese foreign policy. The Neoclassical model is an attempt to integrate these two approaches in ways that feed off both strengths.

First, we need to understand what structural realism tells us about international politics and Chinese foreign policy. The theory, first laid out by Kenneth Waltz, makes three foundational claims: (1) the international system’s ordering principle is anarchy; (2) the system is differentiated into units called states; and (3) the distribution of relative capabilities among these states is the best variable for explaining outcomes within the system. Because there is no overarching authority to keep everyone in check, states generally pursue self-help strategies that maximize individual security at the expense of others. Those states which find themselves in a position of relative weakness are compelled to ameliorate this condition internally through self-strengthening or externally by forming alliances or coalitions. These balancing maneuvers, while they proceed from a rational desire to maximize individual security, nevertheless produce anxiety and fear among other states in the system, leading to the famed “security dilemma.” Thus, international politics, under this model, generally produces reoccurring balances-of-power as the distribution of relative capabilities shifts over time as well as conflict or war when the security dilemma reaches a fevered pitch.

Sometimes these structural causes for war and conflict are augmented by appeals to human nature. Not only do states seek to maximize their individual security in an anarchic system, they also pursue power as a means in-and-of-itself. Thucydides, in recording the Athenian delegation’s response at the Peloponnesian Congress, blends both the imperatives of structural anarchy with the innate impulses of humanity in explaining the sources of empire. Having already achieved a relatively advantageous position in the wake of the Persian Wars, Athens sought to consolidate its advantage and increasingly viewed former allies with fear and mistrust. Sparta, for example, was “by then not our friends as you once were but a source of suspicion and contention, and allies who left us would have gone over to you.” This structurally-induced apprehension was justified further in terms of human nature. Athens concluded, “[we have] done nothing remarkable, or contrary to ordinary human behavior, if we not only accepted an empire when it was offered but also did not let it go . . . not as the originators of such conduct, moreover, as the rule has always existed that the weaker is held down by the stronger.” Indeed, Jonathan Monten points out that the Athenian representative seems to go further by arguing that Athens “behaved more justly than the distribution of power would enable,” when he declares, “all are entitled to praise whenever they follow human nature and end up behaving more justly than their actual power dictates.”

Other iterations of human nature follow this basic trajectory. Machiavelli constructed his princely recommendations on the premise that successful politics work with these forces, rather than against. Reinhold Niebuhr wedded Christian theology to the same insight by acknowledging that all humans are necessarily scarred by original sin and are therefore imperfect in action. Finally, Hans Morgenthau, while often found discussing the delicate intricacies of the balance-of-power, is celebrated for his classical realism and its notion that human beings thirst for power and domination over one another as a matter of nature.

Taken together, what does an emphasis on the balance-of-power and on human nature tell us about Chinese foreign policy? From the perspective of structural realism, three decades of “Reform and Opening” represent one of the fastest shifts in relative capabilities ever seen in the history of international politics. Consequently, some scholars, in making predictions about China’s rise, seem to take the general tendencies outlined by their respective structural realisms as the actual substance of Chinese foreign policy. John Mearsheimer predicts that “China is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere.” This is because “the ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system.” Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, in their classic Foreign Affairs article “China I: The Coming Conflict with America,” imbues a similar analysis with historical sensitivity by adding, “driven by nationalist sentiment, a yearning to redeem the humiliations of the past, and the simple urge for international power, China is seeking to replace the United States as a dominant power in Asia.” Denny Roy rounds out this perspective by arguing, “If the international behavior of states is strongly influenced by threats and opportunities governments perceive in the international system, as realists assume, then China’s growth from a weak, developing state to a stronger, more prosperous state should result in a more assertive foreign policy.”

Regarding the balance-of-power, numerous articles have been written about the prospects of balancing in East Asia. Thomas Christensen, noting how the United States’ military presence in Japan is “a major factor in containing potential tensions in East Asia,” explains how Chinese foreign policy would likely react to a stronger US-Japan security alliance. Robert Ross takes a page from the Offense-Defense balance playbook by emphasizing the “geography of peace” in East Asia, even going so far as to claim that “geography trumps structure” when the two come into conflict. More recently, a great deal of ink has been spilled over China’s so-called “soft balancing” strategy. Still taking the concept of balancing as a basic starting point, scholars argue that China’s leadership has responded to the structural realities of a unipolar world by avoiding “hard balancing” strategies like formal alliance-building and direct confrontation, in favor of “soft” alternative strategies. These include forging “strategic partnerships” with countries like Russia and Iran , pursuing “win-win cooperation” in the energy sector (often to the detriment of US human rights concerns) , and promoting forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as representative of China’s “New Security Concept” and normative influence.

From this brief overview, we can see that structural realism plays an important role in assessments of Chinese foreign policy. They are both informed by the balance-of-power as well as by accounts of human nature. In the following section, I will outline four critiques, two from the IR literature and two from Chinese area studies, which will lay the groundwork for a neoclassical realist model. In looking at the criticisms that incorporate insights from Chinese studies, I will also point out some important qualifications that preserve the role of relative capabilities in an analysis of Chinese foreign policy.