Literature Review Rough Draft

In this post, I am going to take a preliminary swing at my literature review section by rehearsing the basic argument in a more free-flowing written form. In this manner, I hope to capture the essence of what I want to say in a format that is accessible and can subsequently be refined and polished.

My study adopts a neoclassical realist model in order to blend the insights of international relations (IR) theory with that of Chinese area studies. Most models of international politics analyze Chinese foreign policy primarily within the framework of structural realism. These approaches only offer half of the story and are subject to several significant critiques. At the same time, an approach that privileges China’s “uniqueness” also misses the overriding importance that international pressures and relative capabilities do play in the formation of Chinese foreign policy. The Neoclassical model is an attempt to integrate these two approaches in ways that feed off both strengths.

First, we need to understand what structural realism tells us about international politics and Chinese foreign policy. The theory, first laid out by Kenneth Waltz, makes three foundational claims: (1) the international system’s ordering principle is anarchy; (2) the system is differentiated into units called states; and (3) the distribution of relative capabilities among these states is the best variable for explaining outcomes within the system. Because there is no overarching authority to keep everyone in check, states generally pursue self-help strategies that maximize individual security at the expense of others. Those states which find themselves in a position of relative weakness are compelled to ameliorate this condition internally through self-strengthening or externally by forming alliances or coalitions. These balancing maneuvers, while they proceed from a rational desire to maximize individual security, nevertheless produce anxiety and fear among other states in the system, leading to the famed “security dilemma.” Thus, international politics, under this model, generally produces reoccurring balances-of-power as the distribution of relative capabilities shifts over time as well as conflict or war when the security dilemma reaches a fevered pitch.

Sometimes these structural causes for war and conflict are augmented by appeals to human nature. Not only do states seek to maximize their individual security in an anarchic system, they also pursue power as a means in-and-of-itself. Thucydides, in recording the Athenian delegation’s response at the Peloponnesian Congress, blends both the imperatives of structural anarchy with the innate impulses of humanity in explaining the sources of empire. Having already achieved a relatively advantageous position in the wake of the Persian Wars, Athens sought to consolidate its advantage and increasingly viewed former allies with fear and mistrust. Sparta, for example, was “by then not our friends as you once were but a source of suspicion and contention, and allies who left us would have gone over to you.” This structurally-induced apprehension was justified further in terms of human nature. Athens concluded, “[we have] done nothing remarkable, or contrary to ordinary human behavior, if we not only accepted an empire when it was offered but also did not let it go . . . not as the originators of such conduct, moreover, as the rule has always existed that the weaker is held down by the stronger.” Indeed, Jonathan Monten points out that the Athenian representative seems to go further by arguing that Athens “behaved more justly than the distribution of power would enable,” when he declares, “all are entitled to praise whenever they follow human nature and end up behaving more justly than their actual power dictates.”

Other iterations of human nature follow this basic trajectory. Machiavelli constructed his princely recommendations on the premise that successful politics work with these forces, rather than against. Reinhold Niebuhr wedded Christian theology to the same insight by acknowledging that all humans are necessarily scarred by original sin and are therefore imperfect in action. Finally, Hans Morgenthau, while often found discussing the delicate intricacies of the balance-of-power, is celebrated for his classical realism and its notion that human beings thirst for power and domination over one another as a matter of nature.

Taken together, what does an emphasis on the balance-of-power and on human nature tell us about Chinese foreign policy? From the perspective of structural realism, three decades of “Reform and Opening” represent one of the fastest shifts in relative capabilities ever seen in the history of international politics. Consequently, some scholars, in making predictions about China’s rise, seem to take the general tendencies outlined by their respective structural realisms as the actual substance of Chinese foreign policy. John Mearsheimer predicts that “China is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere.” This is because “the ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system.” Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, in their classic Foreign Affairs article “China I: The Coming Conflict with America,” imbues a similar analysis with historical sensitivity by adding, “driven by nationalist sentiment, a yearning to redeem the humiliations of the past, and the simple urge for international power, China is seeking to replace the United States as a dominant power in Asia.” Denny Roy rounds out this perspective by arguing, “If the international behavior of states is strongly influenced by threats and opportunities governments perceive in the international system, as realists assume, then China’s growth from a weak, developing state to a stronger, more prosperous state should result in a more assertive foreign policy.”

Regarding the balance-of-power, numerous articles have been written about the prospects of balancing in East Asia. Thomas Christensen, noting how the United States’ military presence in Japan is “a major factor in containing potential tensions in East Asia,” explains how Chinese foreign policy would likely react to a stronger US-Japan security alliance. Robert Ross takes a page from the Offense-Defense balance playbook by emphasizing the “geography of peace” in East Asia, even going so far as to claim that “geography trumps structure” when the two come into conflict. More recently, a great deal of ink has been spilled over China’s so-called “soft balancing” strategy. Still taking the concept of balancing as a basic starting point, scholars argue that China’s leadership has responded to the structural realities of a unipolar world by avoiding “hard balancing” strategies like formal alliance-building and direct confrontation, in favor of “soft” alternative strategies. These include forging “strategic partnerships” with countries like Russia and Iran , pursuing “win-win cooperation” in the energy sector (often to the detriment of US human rights concerns) , and promoting forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as representative of China’s “New Security Concept” and normative influence.

From this brief overview, we can see that structural realism plays an important role in assessments of Chinese foreign policy. They are both informed by the balance-of-power as well as by accounts of human nature. In the following section, I will outline four critiques, two from the IR literature and two from Chinese area studies, which will lay the groundwork for a neoclassical realist model. In looking at the criticisms that incorporate insights from Chinese studies, I will also point out some important qualifications that preserve the role of relative capabilities in an analysis of Chinese foreign policy.

Global Times (环球时报) Sentences the Grass Mud Horse to Decapitation

One of my favorite newspapers in China is the Global Times. This delightful rag is actually an arm of the People's Daily but it consciously targets the country's more nationalistic market. Especially in China's early modern history, nationalist revolts and uprisings have been an ever-lingering threat to the incumbent regime. The Qing dynasty, throughout its tumultuous four-hundred year reign, was periodically subject to different forms of developed and proto-nationalism.

When the dynasty was first established, the imperial government spent several decades in an effort to consolidate control over Ming strongholds in the south. Ming loyalists, who were ultimately pushed back to Taiwan before finally being subdued, attempted to mobilize support for their cause by characterizing the Manchus as uncivilized, non-Chinese barbarians bent on usurping China's cultural legacy.

When the Qing were defeated in the 1842 Opium Wars at the hands of the British, they were subjected to an "Unequal Treaty System" that forcefully opened up many parts of China to foreign commerce, missionary activity, and of course narcotics. This traumatic experience eventually saw the rise of the Taiping who blended elements of Protestant doctrine with Confucian and Buddhist teachings. The Taiping, under the leadership of Hong Xiuquan, launched their bid to establish a "Heavenly Kingdom of Peace" (太平天国) by tapping into a potent wellspring of Anti-Manchu sentiment. Their highly disciplined army rampaged throughout most of southern China, routing Qing forces and even capturing the city of Nanjing which subsequently became the Taiping capital in 1853.

Although the Qing were finally able to eventually crush the "long-haired" rebels, it wasn't long before another surge of nationalist feeling would force their hand in the "Boxer Uprising." Whereas previous expressions of proto-nationalism were generally directed at the Manchu government, this time the target was foreigners, particularly Christian missionaries and their western backers in the Shandong region (Joseph Esherick's "The Boxer Uprising" is without a doubt my favorite book on the subject, highly recommended). The Empress Dowager Cixi, tried to ride this nationalist wave but was quickly overpowered by an international force which occupied Beijing and subsequently torched the Summer Palace (as well as making off with those Zodiac Bronze heads that have been in the news recently).

By then, the Qing were on their last legs though it would take one more nationalist-inspired mass movement to finally bring them down. Sun Yat-sen and the May 4th movement drew from a fundamental desire to make China strong once more and restore her once-unquestionable centrality and glory. Self-strengthening was the order of the day and Chinese intellectuals throughout much of the early twentieth-century occupied themselves with questions of national salvation and rejuvenation. Once the Qing were overthrown in a fit of patriotism, it wouldn't be long before the CCP itself used the same tactic to throw the GMD out and establish a "New China." The CCP drew on its Anti-Japanese legacy during World War II and was quick to label the Nationalists as collaborators and traitors to China. Thus, the CCP knows a thing or two about the role of nationalism in Chinese political history and just how unpredictable it can be.

This brings us back to Global Times and its role as a Party mechanism to monitor, control and guide public opinion in a constructive and non-threatening manner. If you look at the online survey which is updated regularly with new poll questions you can get a sense for what the leadership, or at least the propaganda authorities, thinks is important. Most straw poll questions deal with current affairs. For example, this week's question is "Do you think China is a victim of Internet Spying?" (你认为中国是网络间谍受害者吗？) This question is clearly a response to the team of Canadian researchers who alleged this week that an enormous internet spy ring affecting more than 100 countries originated largely in China. Other times the questions pertain to China's role in global affairs, its relative status vis-a-vis other countries like India and Russia, etc. Clearly these poll questions are not designed with rigorous social science methods in mind, rather their purpose is to offer an outlet for nationalist sentiment as well as a means for the government to gauge what opinion is at any given moment. I spend a good deal of time pouring over these surveys and will be compiling a rough statistical snapshot of their content in the next few days.

Now that we are somewhat familiar with Global Times let me bring us back to the title subject: the Grass Mud Horse. In 2008 there emerged from the Chinese internets a series of "ten mythical Chinese creatures" (中国十大神兽） each of which has a name that is homophonous with various vulgar expressions. By far the most popular seems to be the "Grass Mud Horse" (草泥马). The alternative meaning in Chinese involves sexual acts and a certain family relation. I cannot attest to the expression's initial popularity or prevalence in Chinese discourse, though I did hear a driver yell it to someone last week. At any rate, the expression is steadily becoming a stable aspect of China's blogosphere and has taken on even greater political significance for two reasons. First, the expression seems to be a form of passive resistance, a kind of raspberry to the Chinese Nanny state that tries to patrol and preserve the moral character of the internet. Second, the Chinese government has recently launched a general campaign against filth on the internet (details can be found at www.danwei.org), in particular pornography, violence, and video which "distorts Chinese culture, Chinese history, and historical facts."

In today's Global Times it would appear that the Grass Muddy Horse too has been issued a socialist fatwa by the powers that be. In an opinion piece entitled "The Grass Mud Horse Should be Immediately Decapitated" (“草泥马”应该斩立决）, an anonymous author (perhaps the editorial board) catalogues why these expressions should receive swift and immediate punishment. Not only are these expressions not worthy of the Confucian gentleman, they will also hurt advertisers' bottom line, including the workers employed by those companies. This is obviously unacceptable and leads the author to conclude, "The ten mythical creature names are all curse words, they simply are amoral, confuse good with evil, fail to distinguish beauty from ugliness, and make people feel nauseous and revolting. We should immediately decapitate them."

Obviously, Global Times thinks we should take action. But how? By building a harmonious society of course! "在我看来，创建和谐文明网络环境，彻底刹住互联网低俗之风，必须建立一套长效监督机制" Establishing an effective supervising mechanism will not be easy, however. It requires concerted measures which will integrate technology, the law, the market, campuses and other areas of strength. In other words, they probably don't have a clue. While we may take solace in the fact that "grasping the spirit of building a civilized, comprehensive societal consciousness of responsibility" will lead to the preservation of both internet and business interests. Ultimately, the best line of defense for Global Times is to raise "Netizens' self-discipline consciousness." My sense is that such a approach will only be met with a cynical, yet quiet, "草泥马”.